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Abstract
In day-to-day life we encounter decisions amongst prospects that do
not have a convex structure. To address this concern, Herstein and Milnor
introduce mixture sets and provide necessary and sucient conditions for
a cardinal and linear utility representation. We derive the same utility
representation for partial mixture sets: where the mixture operation is
only partially dened. The resulting model has an interesting application
to nance. In particular, we use paths instead of events to elicit utility
and beliefs about stock prices. This feature is promising for settings where
the dimension of the state space is large.
1 Introduction
Many would agree that good apples are crispy and that good oranges are tangy.
Experts' tastes are highly rened along such scales, with procurement and pric-
ing hinging entirely on such comparisons. The ability to measure utility on a
single scale that transcends specic characteristics is essential to many elds in
economics.
Using their famous example of a glass of tea and a cup of coee, von Neumann
and Morgenstern famously described how this might be achieved using lotteries
as a measurement device. Up to some reasonable approximation, experimenters
today are able to measure utility up to multiplication by a positive scalar and
addition by an arbitrary constant (a cardinal scale). Yet lotteries may lead to
distortions that are intrinsic to the uncertainty they introduce. Herstein and
Milnor showed that line segments (convex combinations of lotteries) may be
replaced with mixture paths, and utility may still be measured.
yI thank Simon French, Simon Grant, Peter Hammond, Andrea Isoni, Saul Jacka, Je
Kline, John Quiggin, Aron Toth and Horst Zank for their helpful suggestions and detailed
feedback. I am especially grateful to Simon Grant, Je Kline and John Quiggin for their
encouragement.
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Overview
In the present paper, we allow for the possibility that some of the mixture paths
are missing: for instance when there is no obvious mixture path between a crispy
apple and a tangy orange. The main theorem identies necessary and sucient
conditions for a cardinal and linear utility representation when mixtures are
partially dened in this way. Our proof is constructive and introduces concepts
that are, to our knowledge, new. En route to this result, we provide detailed
insight into the nature of mixture paths themselves.
Finally, we show how the model may be applied to elicit beliefs about stock
prices in an experimental setting, where prices evolve in continuous time. In
the specic setting we describe, the instruments we use to elicit beliefs are
(nonconvex) mixture paths known as Brownian bridges. The partial mixture
set structure allows us to elicit beliefs using pure subjective moments: there is
no need to consider mixtures between moments of dierent order.
Theoretical framework The idea of measuring utility using lotteries can
be traced back to the St. Petersburg paradox and the \moral expectation" of
Bernoulli [4]. By considering preferences over lotteries, von Neumann and Mor-
genstern show that utility can, in principle, be measured in much the same way
as temperature (on a cardinal scale). In view of the fact that most prospects in
life are not lotteries, HM show that the convex structure of lotteries is unneces-
sary for the purposes of measuring utility.
The rst goal of the present paper is to gain a deeper understanding of the
abstraction of convexity that HM introduced and its relationship with their
axioms on preferences. HM dene preferences over elements in a mixture set.
In a mixture set, every pair of prospects is connected by a special kind of path:
the subpath between every pair of points along this path is \synchronised" with
the path (see g. 1). HM then require preferences to respect axioms that are
necessary and sucient for a cardinal and linear utility representation.
Our main innovation is to drop the requirement that every pair of prospects
is connected by a path of mixtures. In other words, we weaken the \for all" re-
quirement of HM and formally introduce partial mixture sets. This modication
has a number of far-reaching implications. For instance preferences satisfying
the HM axioms (constrained to hold on the mixture paths that exist) may have
no utility representation. Via examples we show that for a cardinal and linear
utility representation, stronger axioms are needed to accommodate the more
general structure of partial mixture sets. To our knowledge, we are the rst to
provide conditions for such a utility representation that are both necessary and
sucient.
Partial mixture sets are motivated by our toy example regarding the absence
of a path connecting the small world of crispy apples and the small world tangy
oranges. But one may argue that the solution is to nd a common attribute,
perhaps juiciness, that transcends the two goods. But how should we do this
when our tool for measuring utility is preferences? The alternatives available
to the economist who wishes to measure utility are constrained by physical,
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biological or psychological boundaries. Many objects, like houses have inherent
discrete properties; not all genetic permutations of fruit are possible; and why
assume that the decision maker imagines the same convex set of lotteries we
have in mind?
Application A compelling reason for adopting partial mixture sets is that
they are allow the modeller to tailor the domain of preferences to suit the
problem at hand. This is particularly relevant in \large world" decision settings,
such as nance, where models are often complicated enough without introducing
the additional layer of uncertainty that lotteries would entail.
Consider a trader that has well-formed, but perhaps inaccurate beliefs about
the daily evolution of the stock prices of Apple Inc. In seeking to elicit her beliefs
from preferences, it would be natural to adopt the benchmark model of [2]. We
argue that the diculty is twofold. First, we must construct a mixture set. This
entails setting up a host of derivative securities that yield payos that depend
on the path that price takes. (These derivatives correspond to \acts" in the
model of Anscombe and Aumann.) Derivatives are typically hard to evaluate.
The second diculty persists even if we restrict attention to acts of the simplest
form: binary options that pay a dollar if event E occurs and zero otherwise. The
issue is that events are highly non-trivial in this setting. The simplest events
are commonly known as cylinder sets (see gure 2). Are decision makers able
to gauge the likelihood of such objects?
Instead, we propose constructing a partial mixture set using stochastic paths
and eliciting Val's subjective moments (as subjective expectations of powers of
random variables) and appealing to our extension of the HM model. Athough
one would have to elicit a countable innity of moments to really pin down (the
set of) beliefs, the cost of using [2] or [25] still seems higher. This is because
there are well-established methods that prescribe what to do in practice when
only elicit a nite number of moments are feasible. In particular, by minimising
the entropy relative to uniform we obtain a worst case (least informed) estimate
of the trader's beliefs. Or, if the true distribution is available, the best case
estimate of beliefs is found by minimising the relative to the truth. Of course,
only an experiment would settle the question of whether our proposal improves
on the standard approach and that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Related literature
There are a number of strands that take preferences are primitive and that
are in the same spirit as ours. The rst strand (see [8] and references therein)
remains close to HM by assuming a product of mixture sets and corresponding
axioms. Since a product of sets can be rewritten as a discrete or disjoint union,
the conditions for a partial mixture set are satised, and so our representation
theorem generalises these results. In the second strand ([18], [11] and [17]),
lottery spaces that form a partial mixture space are adopted. In contrast with
the present paper and the rst strand, these models provide axioms that are
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only sucient for a representation. We provide a more detailed comparison in
the discussion of the representation theorem.
The approach of Krantz et al. [19] also allows for nonconvex spaces. Instead
they consider spaces that have objects that are \equally spaced" according to
some external measure. (Consider, for instance, the natural numbers.) This
property is not a requirement for partial mixture sets.
In a recent paper Richter and Rubinstein [23] discuss abstract convexity in
an equilibrium context. The kind of abstraction considered there would allow
for discrete sets with no possibility of a cardinal utility representation. On the
other hand, if cardinal utility were to feature in their model, then the partial
mixture set structure we propose would be a natural place to start.
2 Model
Prospects and preferences Let X denote a nonempty set of prospects.
Provided x and y belong to X, the statement \y is weakly preferred to x" is
summarised by the expression x À y. The collection À of such statements is
the primitive object that we henceforth refer to as preferences. Formally, À is
a binary relation on X, so that À is a subset of X X. As a consequence, the
statement x À y already implies x; y P X. The following partial converse is the
completeness axiom: if x; y P X, then x À y or y À x. It ensures that every pair
of prospects is comparable. Transitivity requires that x À y and y À z together
imply x À z. These two axioms of HM are standard and thoroughly discussed
elsewhere.
Axiom O. À is transitive and complete on X.
As usual,   denotes the asymmetric, strict subrelation of À and the sym-
metric, indierence subrelation is denoted by . In this way, preferences are
partitioned, so that x À y if and only if either x   y or x  y. An important
point to note for what follows is that, when a decision maker's preferences sat-
isfy O, the basic open sets tx1 : x   x1u and tx1 : x1   yu such that x; y P X
generate a topology   on X. (Every open set is a union of nite intersections
of these basic sets.) We do not assume the decision maker is conscious of this
topology. Rather, we view this a part of the modeller's toolkit and refer to it
as the topology generated by preferences or the preference order topology. As
with HM, no external topological conditions are required of X.
Paths and mixtures Throughout, I will denote the closed unit interval r0; 1s
in R. WhenX is a convex set, the convex combination of any given pair x; y P X,
is a map  ÞÑ p1 qx  y P X for each  P I. This map constitutes a certain
kind of path from x to y. Seeking minimal conditions for measuring utility,
HM introduced a special form of path that substantially generalises the notion
of convexity. The denition that now follows coincides with that of HM when
every pair of prospects x; y P X denes a path of mixtures xy. Formally, we
weaken the denition of HM by allowing a partial function to characterise the
4
paths on X. Recall that a partial function is one that is not dened throughout
its domain.
Denition 1. pX;q is a partial mixture set whenever  : XX I Ñ X is a
partial function such that if xy : px; y; q is dened, then for every ;  P I,
P1 xyp0q  x ;
P2 yx is dened and yxpq  xyp1 q ; and
P3 z  xypq implies xz is dened and xzpq  xypq:
The fact that  is a partial function ensures that if xy is dened, then it
is uniquely identied by the points x and y. Together, P1 and P2 conrm that
x and y are the endpoints of xy. P3 really is the cornerstone of the denition,
for as we highlight in the discussion of example 4 below, it also rules out certain
ordered sets that are too large to be represented by a real-valued utility function.
(Recall this is a function U : X Ñ R such that x À y if and only if Upxq ¤ Upyq.)
When there is no ambiguity about the identity of , is common practice to
simply refer to X as the partial mixture set with the understanding that this is
shorthand for pX;q. With a minor abuse of notation, we let  also denote the
collection of mixture paths xy in X. The condition for X to be a mixture set
is then
tpx; yq : xy P u  X X:
In the sequel, we will often refer to a path in  without reference to its endpoints.
For instance, we may consider a given path  or a sequence 1; 2; : : : of paths
in .
Paths as building blocks for the model When X is a mixture set, the
fact that it has a full set of paths makes it a self-contained building block for
the model. When X is only a partial mixture set, we must turn to paths in 
for building blocks. For this reason, the following proposition is a useful place
to start. With the aid of g. 1, it summarises the implications of conditions P1,
P2 and P3 .
Proposition 1. y For each xy P , the image xypIq is a mixture set. More-
over, for every x1; y1 P xypIq, there exists ;  P I such that
x1y1pq  xypp1 q  q for every  P I: (1)
By proposition 1, we may apply the results of HM to any given path in .
Figure 1 and (1) present a very precise relationship between a path in  and its
subpaths. When two paths are related via (1), we say they are synchronised. In
what follows we will extend this denition to allow for indierences to replace
equality. When X is a partial mixture set, a primary motivation for the axioms
on preferences, is to ensure the building blocks that are the paths in  can be
ySee page 24 for proof.
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Figure 1: The graph of xy is the set of pairs p; zq such that  P I and
z  xypq. Note that this inverse-S shaped curve in I  X diers from the
well-known counterpart in Prospect Theory [16] which belongs to I  I. We
discuss this point further in connection with Rank-dependent utility theory of
Quiggin [22] in section 4 below. When P2 holds, the graph of yx coincides
with the set of pairs mapped out by xyp1q. Note that, in this example, the
graph of yx is also upward sloping and inverse S-shaped, provided we place y
at the origin. This is not true of xx1 . When P3 holds, the graph of xx1 is
the set p; zq such that  P I and z  xypq: the initial, concave segment
of xy. Combining all three conditions, proposition 1 shows that the graph of
x1y1 is characterised by points in the middle segment, that is p; zq such that
z  xypp1 q  q.
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put together in a synchronised manner. Heuristically speaking, a path is syn-
chronised with another if it coincides with another path once it is truncated and
the \rate of travel" along it is adjusted accordingly. Of course, with preferences
providing the only topological structure on X, notions such as \rate of travel"
and \distance" are not well-dened. By dening mixture sets in this abstract
way, the point that HM seek to make is that, provided the paths in  preserve
the structure of the interval I, denition 1 is all we need to measure utility.
Indeed, the second motivation for the axioms on preferences that follow is to
ensure that the image of a path in  has similar properties to those of I.
Two ways of generating partial mixture sets As we will see in example 1,
without any further restrictions on preferences, even an arbitrary discrete set can
be a mixture set. In the present subsection, we present examples and concepts
that complement the axioms that follow.
One way to obtain a partial mixture set is to simply remove points from a
mixture set. The paths that remain in tact after this deletion generate a partial
mixture set. An intuitive way to summarise the idea is to think of the earth's
surface as a mixture set and the surface of the continents as a partial mixture
set. The following proposition and argument formalises this intuition.
Proposition 2. y Let X be the surface of a sphere and let  be the set of all
geodesic paths on X. Then pX;q is a mixture set.
Subject to some additional, but reasonable assumptions, we may take X in
proposition 2 to be the earth's surface. Now let X 1 be the set of points on land,
so that X 1 describes the surface of the continents. Moreover, let 1  t P  :
pIq  X 1u. Since every path in 1 automatically satises P1, P2 and P3, the
continents can indeed be written as a partial mixture set.
Another way to generate partial mixture sets is to combine a collection
tXa : a P Au of mixture sets. This is possible provided we note that pairs of
endpoints uniquely identify paths in a partial mixture set. Thus, one condition
for combining mixture sets is that no pairXa andXb such that a  b shares more
than a single point. Alternatively, we ensure that the paths in the intersection
Xa XXb coincide.
In fact, as we discuss further in section 4, the case where the collection is
pairwise disjoint already accounts for many models in the literature. When the
collection is pairwise disjoint,
 tXa : a P Au denotes the disjoint union. For
the reasons we have just outlined, it is clear that the following statement holds.
Proposition 3. Every disjoint union of mixture sets is a partial mixture set.
The converse of proposition 3 is not possible in general. Indeed it is only
possible if the set  of paths induces a partition of X. (Recall that a partition
is characterised by an equivalence relation, that is a reexive, symmetric and
transitive binary relation.) We now describe how to test whether  induces a
partition on X.
ySee proof on page 25
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Consider the set of pairs px; yq such that xy P . The only property that
follows directly from the denition of a partial mixture set is symmetry: if
xy P , then yx P . But, if every point in X belongs to some path in , then
P1 implies xx P . When this is true, the relation induced by  is reexive.
As we have seen in proposition 1, the denition of a partial mixture set is such
that when xy P , then for every z P xypIq, both xz and zy belong to
. The nal requirement for a partial mixture set to be written as a disjoint
union of mixture sets, transitivity, is the converse property: if xz; zy P ,
then for some unique 0      1, xy belongs to  and it can be written as the
concatenation
xypq 
"
xzp{q 0 ¤  ¤ 
zy pp q{p1 qq  ¤  ¤ 1 (2)
The justication for (2) lies in a simple inversion of the transformation  ÞÑ
p1 q   and an appeal to equation (1) of proposition 1.y
Clearly, the latter assumption makes sense in some applications. It would,
for example, make sense in when X is transport network, where the intuition
is that upon arriving at z from x, we could continue on to y. But in many
settings, the path from x to y may not be via z. This is precisely the case in the
application of section 3. Indeed, the earth-continents example above does not
satisfy this property either: simply because the only paths in 1 are geodesic.
This demonstrates that partial mixture sets are more versatile than a disjoint
union of mixture sets. Broadly speaking, whenever concerns relating to the
design of an experiment lead us to omit certain paths, partial mixture sets may
have an important role to play.
Cardinal and linear utility If paths in  are to be the building blocks,
they had better have a meaningful structure. Since meaning is dened relative
to our goal (a cardinal and linear utility representation), let us rst dene these
concepts. A function U : X Ñ R is linear if, for every xy P , the composite
function U  xy : I Ñ R satises
pU  xyqpq  p1 qUpxq   Upyq for every  P I.
A utility representation U with a certain property (such as linearity) is cardinal
if every other utility V with the same property is related via a single positive
ane transformation. In particular, V  U   , where  ¡ 0 and  P R.
The following example highlights that, in absence of any form of continuity,
even the requirement that X is a mixture set is very weak indeed.
Example 1 (A discrete mixture set). Let X  tx; yu and suppose x   y. Let
xypq  x if    1 and xyp1q  y. Then, for every  P I, let yxpq 
yIn fact, for the rst line, we may appeal to P3 directly: for each  P I, xzpq  xypq
if and only if xzp{q  xypq when  ¡ 0. For the second, simply take   1 and, since
   1, the resulting inversion yields  ÞÑ p q{p1 q for  ¤  ¤ 1.
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xyp1 q, xxpq  x and yypq  y. It is not hard to check that these four
paths are uniquely dened in such a way that X is a mixture set.
Clearly no utility representation of these preferences can be linear. The
trouble is the fact that xypq  x for every    1 combined with the fact that
x   y. The rst equality implies pU  xyqpq  Upxq for every    1. Then the
fact that U is a utility representation ensures that pU  xyqpq does not tend
to Upyq as  tends to 1 even though xyp1q  y. This is in stark contrast with
p1 qUpxq   Upyq which varies continuously between Upxq and Upyq.
The essence of example 1 is that U  xy is discontinuous at 1 and since X
is discrete, the source of discontinuity is clearly xy. We now clarify what is
meant by continuity of xy.
Continuous paths When X is a topological space, a path f is normally
required to be continuous. That is, if F is closed inX, then the preimage f1pF q
is closed in I. Given O, basic closed sets in the preference order topology are
of the form tx : x À zu and tx : z À xu. So in order to check f is continuous it
suces to check that t : fpq À zu and t : z À fpqu are closed subsets of I.
For the case where X is a mixture set, this is precisely the form of continuity
axiom that HM introduced. Our axiom is generalised only so as to accommodate
the partial nature of .
Axiom C. For every  P  and every z P X, the sets t : pq À zu and
t : z À pqu are closed in I.
Consequences of O and C The rst and most basic consequence of O and C
is that the image of each path  in  is connected and compact in the preference
order topology on X. Given that I is connected and compact and  : I Ñ X is
continuous, it is not surprising that pIq shares these properties. Since pIq is
connected, it cannot be written as a pair of nonempty, disjoint closed sets of the
form tx1 : x1 À xu and tx1 : y À x1u such that x   y. This means that, for each
x; y P pIq, if x   y, then pIq contains z such that x   z   y. This ensures
that example 1 is ruled out by C.
Building on this connectedness property, the following lemma shows that we
are not conned to pIq such that  P . The indierence relation allows us to
make our rst step towards putting the building blocks that are the paths in 
together. This lemma corresponds to theorem 1 of HM.
Lemma 1. y Let preferences on X satisfy O and C. If xy P , z P X and
x   z   y, then there exists 0      1 such that z  xypq.
Lemma 1 provides a basic existence requirement that is necessary for any
linear representation U . Indeed, if x   z   y, then p1qUpxq Upyq  Upzq
for some unique 0      1. When, for any such z, there is a unique  satisfying
lemma 1, the set xypIq is linearly ordered : there is just one z P xypIq such
ySee page 25 for proof.
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that xypq  z. Continuity of xy together with the fact that x   y then
imply that xypq   xyp1q if and only if    1. In this case, xypIq is a linear
continuum: a linearly ordered, connected subset of X such that the inmum
(and supremum) according to À of any subset is uniquely dened. In particular,
inf xy  x and supxy  y.
If xypIq is a linear continuum, then so is the image of U  xy. But since
there is nothing in the axioms introduced so far to ensure that  of lemma 1 is
unique, further axioms are needed. In the setting where X is a partial mixture
set, this turns out to be the most important consequence of the usual indepen-
dence axiom.
Independence The following condition coincides with axiom 3 of HM when
X is a mixture set: a concise form of the well-known independence axiom.
Axiom I. If ;  P , p0q  p0q and p1q  p1q, then p1{2q  p1{2q.
Together O, C and I are enough to ensure that a path xy such that x  y
satises xypq  x for every  P I. This follows directly from theorem 2d of
HM. Clearly, if  P  is any other path such that p0q  p1q  x, then the
same argument implies pq  xypq for every  P I. Since this is a necessary
condition for a linear utility representation of preferences, we see that I has the
intended eect: but only if we restrict attention to paths with endpoints that
belong to a single indierence set. As we shall see, this is far from the case when
x   y.
Before exploring this key issue, we use I to improve on lemma 1 and show
that xypIq is indeed a linear continuum when x   y. This lemma combines
theorems 4 and 6 of HM.
Lemma 2. y Let preferences on X satisfy O, C and I. If xy P  and x   y,
then x   z   y if and only if there is a unique 0      1 such that z  xypq.
When X is a mixture set lemma 2 is enough to yield a cardinal, linear utility
represention. But, as the following example highlights, it is easy to see that I
is too weak when X is a partial mixture set.
Example 2 (Preferences satisfying I with no linear utility representation). z
Let ;  P , where  is a path from x to x1 and  a path from y to y1. Moreover,
suppose that x  y   x1  y1. Clearly every utility representation U satises
Upxq  Upyq  r and Upx1q  Upy1q  r1 for some r   r1 P R. For U to be
linear, we need  and  to be synchronised in such a way that p1{2q  p1{2q.
Only then do we have
pU  qp1{2q  pU  qp1{2q  pr   r1q{2:
The trouble is that, I only applies when at least one of the endpoints of  and
 coincide. In this case, x  y or x1  y1. If  were to contain the path x1y,
ySee page 25 for proof.
zA similar example can be found at Karni and Safra [18, p.324].
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then two applications of I would ensure that each of  and  is synchronised
with x1y. When X is a partial mixture set, there is no guarantee that such a
path exists. As such, I is compatible with preferences satisfying p1{2q   p1{2q.
Example 2 highlights that the restriction of preferences satisfying I to any
subset of X that is a mixture set has a linear representation. It also shows that,
in general, I is insucient for a linear representation on the whole of X. This
is relevant to the empirical setting where data on two or more distinct mixture
sets is collected separately. Even though I holds on each of these, there is no
guarantee that there is a linear utility representation on the union. In fact,
this example provides a glimpse of a much deeper problem. One that goes to
the heart of the relationship between the independence axiom and the mixture
set structure. In the next example we dene a partial mixture set upon which
preferences may satisfy O, C and I and have no utility representation.
Example 3 (A union of short lines). Let A  denote a well-ordered set of the
form t0; 1; 2; : : : u. Each element a P A  indexes a potential level of awareness
of a trader, Val. We assume that A  is the set of all countable ordinal numbers.
Thus, for each a P A , the set tb P A  : b   au is countable, even though A 
itself is uncountable. (The situation is similar to the way that Z  is countably
innite even though every one of its elements is nite.)
Each level of awareness is associated with its own mixture set Xa and X tXa : a P A u. Since X is a disjoint union of mixture sets, proposition 3
ensures that it is a partial mixture set. The awareness structure we have in
mind resembles that of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [12]. Let preferences on X
satisfy O, C and I.
Take each Xa to be the set of all functions from a state space Sa into a set
of consequences Ca that satises the following properties for each a P A .
(i) Ca is order isomorphic to R , where the linear ordering À of Ca is inducedy
from preferences over constant functions in Xa;
(ii) inf Ca  inf Ca 1;
(iii) there exists ca 1 P Ca 1 such that c   ca 1 for every c P Ca.
Property (i) ensures that Xa is a mixture set, where mixtures between functions
are taken pointwise in Ca. From property (ii), we see that all the mixture sets
contain a common lower bound.
It is property (iii) that makes this problem interesting. Yet it is also well-
motivated since it seems reasonable to expect that awareness levels are payo
relevant, especially given the competitive nature of Val's work. Since A  is
uncountable there is no possibility of a utility representation U of preferences.
This is because the image of U is a subset of R: thus every collection of nonempty
pairwise disjoint open subsets is countable.
For a and b that are separated by a limit ordinal in A , property (iii) and
the assumption that X is a mixture set together imply that paths in Xa and Xb
ySee Schmeidler [26] for an exposition of this step.
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necessarily travel at dierent rates. The fact thatXa andXb are disjoint renders
I impotent. We return to this example and explore this point in proposition 5.
The preferences identied in example 3 have no (real-valued) utility rep-
resentation because they do not satisfy the countable chain condition: every
pairwise disjoint collection of nonempty open preference intervals is countable.
The surprising fact is that this is true even though preferences satisfy O, C and
I on each mixture set Xa, so that, by HM, on any such subset a cardinal, linear
utility representation exists.
A stronger independence axiom The above diculties may be overcome
by strengthening I. The condition we need must be capable of synchronising
paths with endpoints that belong to the same indierence set.
Axiom S. If ;  P , p0q  p0q and p1q  p1q, then p1{2q  p1{2q.
S implies I provided indierence is reexive (for then x  y implies x  y).
As the proof of the following proposition shows, the converse is also true when
indierence is transitive and X is a mixture set. This provides some justication
for the claim that S is a natural extension of the standard independence axiom
to settings where  is only partially dened.
Proposition 4. y Let X be a mixture set and let preferences satisfy O. Then
I holds if and only if S does.
The next lemma shows that the preferences of example 2 are excluded by
axiom S. It may also be viewed as an improvement on lemma 2. In particular
it goes some way towards showing that overlapping paths are synchronised.
Lemma 3. z Let preferences on X preferences satisfy O, C and S. If xy P 
and x   z   y, then there is a unique 0      1 such that pq  z for every
 P  such that p0q  x and p1q  y.
The implications of S for synchronising paths go much further than lemma 3,
indeed we will show that it rules out example 3. But both for this purpose and
our derivation of a cardinal and linear utility, we need to know how to generate
new paths from those in .
Continuous concatenations of paths in  Condition P3 and proposition 1
tell us how a smaller path can be written in terms of a larger path. We now
provide a way to construct a larger path, that is a concatenation of paths in .
The basic concept of concatenation was introduced in (2). This allows us
to write a path in  in terms of two subpaths. We now extend this idea to
generate new paths in X from those in . This extension is only possible if
we let adjoining endpoints of paths in a concatenation be dierent. Whereas
in (2) xz and zy were subpaths of xy, we wish to concatenate xz and z1y
ySee page 25 for proof.
zSee page 26 for proof.
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provided the weaker condition z  z1 holds. This generalisation clearly parallels
the one that led us to give up I in favour of S.
A minor obstacle arises when z  z1. If f is the resulting concatenation, then
since it is a function, it cannot satisfy fpq  z and fpq  z1. To simplify the
exposition, we adopt the convention that f coincides with xz on the interval
r0; q and with z1y on r; 1s.
Denition 2. f : I Ñ X is a concatenation in  if there exists 0; : : : ; m P 
such that np1q  n 1p0q, fp1q  mp1q and
fpq  npp  nq{pn 1  nqq (3)
for 0  0        m 1  1 and  P rn; n 1q.
When f is a concatenation such that fp0q  x and fp1q  y, we simply say
that f is a concatenation from x to y. If f is a concatenation of just one path,
then m  1 and f P . But, regardless of whether f P , the fact that f maps
I into X implies that f is a path in X. Moreover, in the presence of O and
C, the concatenations of denition 2 are continuous. In addition to the axioms,
this conclusion follows from the restriction to concatenations wth consecutive
components that satisfy np1q  n 1p0q. (As well as the fact that the union
of nitely many closed sets is closed.)
We now rene our concept of (path) concatenation with a view to identifying
those f that are synchronised with every path in .
Synchronising concatenations A concatenation f from x to y is synchro-
nising whenever every  P  such that x À inf  and sup À y satises
pq  fpp1 q  q for every  P I
for some ;  P I that are unique whenever x   y. Note that every  P 
is itself a concatenation. As such, the following lemma is a generalisation of
proposition 1 with indierence replacing equality.
Lemma 4. y Let preferences on X satisfy O, C and S. If  generates a
concatenation from x to y, then it generates a synchronising concatenation from
x to y.
Lemma 4 extends lemmas 1 to 3 from points z such that x   z   y to paths
 such that x À pq À y for every  P I. Moreover, lemma 4 only requires a
sequence of paths in  that connect x and y, so that xy need not belong to
. It turns out that lemma 4 is the most important step in the proof of the
main theorem. To this end, it remains for us to identify minimal conditions on
preferences and  that guarantee synchronising concatenations between every
x; y P X exist and are, up to indierence, unique. Before identifying these
conditions, we end this section by using this new instrument to show that S
rules out example 3.
ySee page 13 for proof.
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Proposition 5. The partial mixture set and preferences of example 3 fail to
satisfy S.
Proof of proposition 5. Recall that in example 3 the order isomorphisms
fw were arbitrary. When S holds, this is not the case. This axiom forces
them to be synchronised. Our proof consists of assuming that S holds and
deriving contradiction. In particular, we show that contrary to the construction
in example 3, either O fails to hold, or, for some w P W, Lw is not a mixture
set.y
An Archimedean, richness condition A very similar argument to the proof
of proposition 5 can be used to show that there is no collection  of paths that
makes the \long line" a mixture set. This ordered set is closely related to
the construction of example 3 and the proof of proposition 5 and is formally
introduced in the next example.
The long line is a well known example of a set that is path-connected. That
is, for every pair x; y of its elements, there is a continuous path from x to y. In
this way, the long line serves to distinguish mixture sets from path-connected
sets. For if the long line were a mixture set, then the representation of HM would
only be a local one: only once for small enough subsets of X do we have a
(partially dened) linear utility representation.
The key to showing the long line is not a mixture set is to use condition P3 to
obtain synchronising concatenations (with equality replacing indierence) that
span the order. The proof has nothing to do with the axioms since x  y if and
only if x  y when X is a line, and both C and S then hold trivially. When X
is a partial mixture set, condition P3 is too weak to rule out the long line.
Example 4 (The long line as a partial mixture set). Consider the set A  of
example 3. Let L   A  lex r0; 1q be the lexicographically ordered product
where the rst dimension is dominant. It is straightforward to nd a paths such
that L  is a partial mixture set: let xy be the convex combination on L  that
is dened if and only if, for some a P A  and r; s P r0; 1q, both x  a  r and
y  a s, and in this case xypq  a t, where t  p1 qr   s. It is clear
that each order interval ra 0; a 1q is a mixture set, and that L  is a disjoint
union of mixture sets indexed by the uncountable set A . It is straightforward
to check that, when preferences coincide with ¤lex, O, C and S hold.
Example 4 conrms that we still do not have sucient conditions for a utility
representation, let alone one that is cardinal and linear. The key reason that
the proof of proposition 5 does not apply is that for any x and y such that
x  w  0 and y  v  0 and w   v, there is no concatenation from x to y.
Even if v  w   1, there is way to concatenate a nite collection 0; : : : ; m in
 in such a way that 0p0q  x and mp1q  y.
We now provide an axiom that rules out example 4. It is stated in the
weakest possible form, one that is easier to verify when, as in our application of
section 3, we are trying to elicit utility or beliefs.
yThe remainder of this proof appears on page 28
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Axiom A. If x   y, then there exists 0; : : : ; m P  such that inf 0 À x,
y À supm and, for each n   m, inf n 1 À supn.
A implies that every pair of prospects such that x   y are connected by
a nite chain of paths in . In view of this, A is an Archimedean condition.
On the other hand, A is clearly a completeness condition on the set of possible
concatenations. That is to say, A is also a richness condition on the set of
paths in . It goes without saying that, although this does place considerable
structure on  relative to preferences, we are still far from requiring that X is
a mixture set: there A is satised with m  1.
Lemma 5. y Let X be a partial mixture set and let preferences satisfy O, C,
S and A. If x   y, then  generates a synchronising concatenation from x to
y.
For the case where x   y, lemma 5 passes the main premise of lemma 4 to
the axioms. The following simple example conrms that our axioms are still too
weak to deliver a cardinal representation.
Example 5 (A is too weak). Let X be the disjoint union of pIq and 1pIq,
where ; 1 P   and suppose that, p1q  1p0q : x1, so that A also holds.
Moreover, suppose that U : X Ñ R is a linear utility representation of pref-
erences. Then, every element of 1pIq other than x1 strictly dominates every
element of pIq.
The trouble is that for any 0      1, we may freely dene a distinct
mixture preserving concatenation f of  and 1 such that fpq  x1. This
will not do for a cardinal representation, for each distinct pair f and g of such
concatenations yields a pair of linear utility representations that are not related
via a single positive ane transformation. Indeed, let fp1{2q  x1  gp1{4q, so
that x1   gp1{2q. Now let V : U  g  f1. Then V is a well-dened linear utility
by virtue of the fact that f is a bijection. Moreover, by construction, the image
of V is the same as that of U . But, since f1px1q  1{2, we have pg  f1qpx1q 
gp1{2q, so that V px1q  pU  gqp1{2q. Since U is a utility representation, this
number exceeds Upx1q  pU  gqp1{4q.
Measuring utility at each x P X In the presence of the other axioms, A
ensures that the decision space is not too large relative to . In particular, the
preference ordering is spanned by a countable chain of paths in : for every
x P X, x  pq for some  P  and  P I. But example 5 demonstrates that
this is not enough. We will now show that for cardinality, what is needed is that
every x P X belongs to the relative interior of  for some  P . The timeless
example of von Neumann and Morgenstern [29], upon which the following is
based, helps to clarify this point.
Example 6. Suppose Val strictly prefers a glass of tea to a cup of coee z in
the afternoon. She also strictly prefers a cup of coee to a plain glass of water x.
ySee page 29 for proof.
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Let  denote the infusion over a ve minute period of tea in a glass. Then von
Neumann and Morgenstern's point is that, upto a reasonable approximation, we
ought to be able to nd a unique time 0      1 such that z  pq. The same
principle carries over to the setting where mixtures are only partially dened.
If Val has a strong aversion to carbonated drinks, then it seems reasonable to
suppose that any carbonation of the water (points on a path 1 from sparkling
water to x) is strictly worse than x. But, if these are the only paths at our
disposal, then example 5 tells us that we cannot measure utility on a single,
cardinal scale. Equivalently, we cannot identify the strength of Val's preference
for x relative to the worst prospect (sparkling water) and the best prospect
(tea). The trouble is that preferences are such that x is not an interior point
relative to any path of mixtures. In other words, we need to enrich the set of
paths.
Examples 5 and 6 simply remind us that cardinality is purely an issue of
measurement. For every prospect, there must be a suitable instrument with
which to measure utility. Since our ultimate goal is to obtain a representation
that is cardinal, the following axiom is unavoidable.
Axiom M. If x   z   y, then inf    z   sup for some  P .
M ensures that every interior point of the preference order is also in the
relative interior of some path. M is trivially satised when X is a mixture set,
for fact that  is everywhere dened ensures that we can take   xy. In view
of this, the main innovation of M is to formalise the fact that in practice we
often have considerable exibility in choosing the path with which to measure.
The following lemma improves on lemmas 1 to 5. It conrms that, together
with the other axioms, M allows us to measure the strength of preference of
any given prospect z relative to any pair x and y such that x   z   y. The
measuring instrument is a synchronising concatenation of paths in .
Lemma 6. y Let X be a partial mixture set and let preferences satisfy O, C,
S, A andM. If x   z   y, then there is a unique 0      1 such that fpq  z
for every synchronising concatenation f from x to y that  generates.
The key contribution lemma 6 is the uniqueness of  regardless of the choice
of concatenation. This means that it does not matter how we \frame" the
paths that form the synchronising concatenations, the strength of preference for
z relative to x and y is the same. By virtue of its strength, Lemma 6 should
provide a useful target for experimental testing in many settings. Any failure of
preferences to satisfy its conclusion, can be investigated by testing the axioms
individually to ascertain the source. This exercise is especially fruitful in light
of the fact that the axioms are also necessary for the conclusion of the lemma.
In fact, as our main theorem now shows if any of the axioms fails to hold, then
there is no utility representation that is cardinal and linear.
ySee page 29 for proof.
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Theorem 1. y Let X be a partial mixture set. O, C, S, A and M hold if and
only if preferences have a cardinal and linear utility representation.
Unlike the case where X is a mixture set, the fact that A andM are neces-
sary for such a representation is not immediately obvious. Examples 4 and 5 go
some way towards demonstrating that they are. One nal example completes
the picture and also leads to a proof of the following novel characterisation of
cardinality.
Corollary 1. z Let X be a partial mixture set and let preferences have a linear
utility representation U . Then U is cardinal if and only if both A andM hold.
3 Application: eliciting beliefs about stock prices
3.1 Basic facts on Wiener processes
Let W  tWt : t P Iu be a standard Wiener process on an abstract probability
space p
;F;Pq. This means that W0  a for some a P R and W is a family of
random variables with continuous paths and stationary, independent increments
Wt Ws that have distribution Np0; t sq for each s ¤ t in I.
By Bichteler [5, p.14], a standard Wiener process is associated with a certain
random path on 
. This is the unique path-valued random variable Wa : 
 Ñ
CapI;Rq with Wiener measure as its probability distribution on CapI;Rq. The
latter is the space of continuous functions w : I Ñ R such that, for t  0,
wt  a. We refer to a given realisation w  Wap!q as a trajectory. For each
t P I, Wa is related to Wt via the evaluation map w ÞÑ wt  Wtpwq. Explicitly,
for each t P I and ! P 
,
Wtp!q  pWt Waqp!q:
The events on which Wiener measure is dened are of the form E  CapI;Rq
such that W1a pEq P F. Basic events are those that are restricted only at nitely
many times t1; : : : ; tm P I. They are known as cylinder sets:
E  tw P CapI;Rq : wtn P An for some A1; : : : ; Am  Ru :
The very simplest functions (also known as acts) that might be used to
elicit beliefs in the Savage [25] and Anscombe and Aumann [2] framework are
functions that take the value one E and zero on its complement. Even if the
experimenter restricts attention only to events that are cylinder sets, we believe
that even sophisticated subjects will struggle to compare two events E and E1
by weighing up the factors that aect their probability: the number m versus
the number m1 of times each event is restricted; the distance from zero of times
tn and t
1
n1 ; the relative measure in R of each An and A1n1 ; the relative centrality
of the latter; and nally how to combine this information to make a judgement.
ySee proof on page 30.
zSee proof on page 32.
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Figure 2: A particularly simple cylinder set E contains all continuous paths in
R that begin at a  0 and pass through intervals A1  rb; cs, A2  rb; as and
A3  rb; bs at times t1, t2 and t3 respectively. Of the four plotted trajectories,
only the lower two belong to E. The other two do not pass through A2 and A3.
The Brownian bridge The random paths that we will work with are a sim-
ple transformation of a Wiener process. Since a standard Wiener process is
nonrandom at t  0, is said to be pinned at a. A Brownian bridge B is a
stochastic process that is pinned at both ends of the interval I. That is B0  a
and B1  b. B is related to W as follows:
Bt  p1 tq

a 
» t
0
1
1 r dWr


  tb (4)
for each t P I. Following common practice, reference to ! P 
 in (4) has been
suppressed. It is the stochastic Ito^ integral in this expression that makes Bt a
random variable on R. In the case where t  1, clearly Bt  b. For each t   1,
distributing the constant 1 t through the parentheses and the integral, yields
a bounded integrand since 1 t ¤ 1 r for each 0 ¤ r ¤ t   1. The continuity
properties of the Ito^ integral then ensure that this Brownian bridge is associated
with a path-valued random variable Wab : 
Ñ CabpI;Rq.
A minor extension of this denition yields the paths that will form our partial
mixture set. Let x  ps; aq, y  pt; bq for some 0 ¤ s   t ¤ 1 and a; b P R. Let
Wxy denote be the random variable that takes values in Cabprs; ts;Rq. Then the
resulting Brownian bridge between x and y is described by the composition of
the evaluation map W with Wxy for each  P I
W Wxy  p1 q

a 
» s ptsq
s
t s
t r dWr

  b:
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Note that since the Ito^ integral is a square-integrable, real-valued random
variable on p
;F;Pq, so is W Wxy for each  P I. And since the expectation
with respect to P of an Ito^ integral is zero,
E
 W Wxy  p1 qa  b: (5)
We now use these random paths to construct a partial mixture set.
A partial mixture set of random variables Let Y denote a nonempty
set of pairs px; yq that give rise to a Brownian bridge of the form we have just
described. Let
X1
def
¤ W Wxy :  P I and px; yq P Y ( :y
We constuct the set 1 of paths that make X1 a partial mixture as follows.
For each px; yq P Y , let xy : I Ñ X1 satisfy xypq def W Wxy. Let Y
denote this collection of paths. Every path in Y has deterministic endpoints
in X.
We now dene a path in 1 to be a subpath (in the sense of proposition 1)
of some path in Y . In particular, a path  : I Ñ Wt belongs to 1 if and only
if, for every  P I, pq  xypp1  q   q for some px; yq P Y and some
;  P I. By construction, each  satises proposition 1, and this ensures that
X is a partial mixture set. Clearly, X is not a mixture set since there is no path
between pq and pq for any    in Y such that 0   ;    1. Moreover,
note in the experimental setting we have in mind, Y would be some nite set
of pairs.
The following proposition shows that the typical path in 1 is not convex.
This conrms the need for the more general, nonconvex framework that partial
mixture sets permit.
Proposition 6. z For any xy P 1 such that x  y, if     and 0      1,
then
xypp1 q  q  p1 qxypq   xypq:
The partial mixture set X1 will allow us to elicit Val's subjective rst mo-
ments of her beliefs. For subjective moments of power k for k  2; 3; : : : , we
dene Xk as follows. For each  P 1, let k denote the kth power of ,
where the power is taken pointwise: for each  P I, kpq def ppqqk. Plainly,
any such k is a continuous, random path that takes values in Rrs;ts for some
0 ¤ s   t ¤ 1.
Now let k
def  k :  P ( and let Xk be the union of the image sets kpIq
such that k P k. Clearly each pXk;kq is a partial mixture set. And whilst
the disjoint union over k of the Xk would also form a partial mixture set, that
would not be the appropriate structure for eliciting subjective moments. We
only want to synchronise paths that are of the same power.
yStrictly speaking, a typical element of X1 is a pair consisting of a time s pt sq and a
real-valued random variable on 
. This is consistent with x  ps; aq and y  pt; bq being the
deterministic endpoints of Wxy . As with !, when this index is superuous, it is suppressed.
zSee page 32 for proof.
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Preferences The above construction of X1; : : : is explicitly known to our
experimenter, Zal. In contrast, the subject Val of the experiment, whose pref-
erences are of interest, only has a subjective view of the stochastic process W.
In the canonical case, Val has observed a \large" number of days of trading of
the underlying AAPL stock which is a standard wiener process. Large means
enough for her beliefs to have converged by the time the experiment begins.
Zal needs to check whether Val's subjective moments are compatible with
Wiener measure. Val is presented with pairs in Xk for k  1; 2; : : : and required
to choose her preferred prospect (indierence is allowed). Val is assumed to
understand that  P Y is generated by sampling a path from the stochastic
process that generates AAPL and revealing to her only the values of that path
that correspond to some pair of times s and t such that s   t. She also knows
that, as the owner of one unit of AAPL stock, she will receive the value kp; !q
if she chooses kpq over kpq for some  P Y . She also knows that by
choosing kpq over kpq, she will receive kp; !q.
We assume that O holds for X  kXk. In particular, we assume that Val
owns a unit of the AAPL stock. For this reason, Val prefers higher prices. Thus,
for any a; b P R, (degenerate) random variables x; y P X such that x  pa; sq
and y  pb; tq, x   y if and only if a   b. In the present setting, this is not
farfetched since I corresponds to a day's trading on the stock market. That
is to say, this also implies that Val does not discount time over the interval I.
Similarly, we assume that Val is risk neutral. These simplifying assumptions
allow us to focus entirely on the issue of eliciting beliefs.
Whereas Wiener process has continuous trajectories, C only requires that the
random paths in  are continuous relative to the order topology onX. Therefore
C allows for more general stochastic processes. If Val's beliefs are characterised
by Wiener measure, then she ought to be certain the process has no jumps. That
is, if limn n  , then Val should view t! : limn pn; !q  p; !qu as a null
event. This requirement should be relatively easy to verify in an experimental
setting. We simply assume this in addition to C and leave to future work the
exploration of any relationship between these two types of continuity.
Note thatA andM are satised provided the pairs in Y are suitably chosen.
In view of the assumptions we have already placed on preferences, this is a simple
matter.
As usual, S is the crucial axiom. If Val satises S on X1, then theorem 1
yields a cardinal and linear utility representation U on X1. In view of the fact
that Val is risk neutral, this tells us that Val's rst moments are correct. Since
this utility representation is cardinal, we can nd a positive ane transformation
of U that is the standard mathematical expectation. We denote this again by
U . Then, for any pair x; y P X1 and  P I, pU  xyqpq satises (5) as required
for Val's rst moments to be correct.
For higher moments, the situation is not quite as straightforward. The issue
is that the variance of a Brownian Bridge is nonlinear in  and dependent on
the size of the time increment. In particular, if x  ps; aq and y  pt; bq then
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the true variance of xypq is
Var
 W Wxy  p 2qpt sq:
To obtain the true expectation of 2xypq, we simply add the square of a pbaq
to the variance. Assuming S applies to paths in 2 will not do. For taking
a  b, implies a2  b2 and, since 2xxpq  a2 for every  P I. Then, O and
S imply 2xyp1{2q  a2, so variance plays no role whatsoever in determining
preferences. In contrast, if Val's beliefs are correct, she would view the event
t! : 2xyp1{2; !q ¡ a2u as an event that occurs with probability one. The way to
address the dependency on the time increment, is to constrain S so that it ap-
plies only to paths 2xy; 
2
x1y1 P 2 such that the corresponding time increments
satisfy t s  t1  s1.
Thus, suppose the certainty equivalent of x; x1 P X2 is a and that of y; y1 P Y2
is b. Then since t s  t1 s1, Val's raw subjective second moments are correct
provided
2xyp1{2q  2x1y1p1{2q  pt sq   pa  bq
2
4
for every such x; x1; y and y1.
Whilst this relaxation of S allows for higher-order subjective moments of
pq that are nonlinear in , it also appears to constitute a departure from the
linear model that we have derived. We now demonstrate how to exploit the
partial mixture set structure in order to extend the linear model to this case.
Consider the case where a  b  0. The more general case is a straightfor-
ward extension. Then let
 ÞÑ   1
2

?
1 
2
;
The following extension of  ÞÑ pq
Existence and uniqueness of beliefs Existence of a continuous cumulative
distribution function on R is characterised by the requirement that the kth
moment mk of any given real-valued random variable x P X1 satises
1 m1 : : : mk
m1 m2 : : : mk 1
...
...
. . .
...
mk mk 1 : : : m2k
 ¡ 0 for k  0; 1; 2; : : :
Provided this additional condition is satised, for each nondegenerate x P X1,
Val's subjective moments are characterised by a nonempty set of measures.
The collection of Val's subjective moments may not uniquely identify a single
probability measure, be it Wiener or any other.
A sucient condition for uniqueness is the Carlemann condition
°
km
1{2k
2k 8 (see Billingsley [6] for a related condition). In essence, this states that the
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measure is unique if the rate of growth of the even moments is slow enough.
A sucient condition for nonuniqueness is the Krein condition. See the clas-
sic reference Akhieser [1] and the more recent Stoyanov [28] for more in depth
discussions of this topic, which is known as the Hamburger moment problem.
Entropy Of course in practice, there will be some nite k1 such that the
experimenter stops eliciting higher moments. Then clearly Val's beliefs will be
underidentied. This is a practical concern, and it is worth noting that the
situation would be the same if the experimenter chose to elicit beliefs using
events instead. The hope is that more information may be elicited from the
lower moments than from the functions on cylinder sets described above.
Having elicited the rst k1 moments for a representative sample of X1, the
experimenter nds himself in a position that is rather common in physics and
statistics. He has rich information about lower moments and no information
about higher moments. If he adopts a conservative stance about Val's beliefs,
he should model them with the probability distribution that maximises the
entropy in the system.
We now explain how he might go about this. Let Fxpk1q denote the set of
possible denstities on R that are compatible with his observations of Val's rst
k1 moments for a given x P X1. For each f P Fxpk1q, let
Hpf; 1q def
»
R
f pln f  ln 1qdr:
The argument f P Fxpk1q that minimises Hp; 1q is the closest density to the
uniform. This identies the minimum relative entropy distribution, which co-
incides with the one that maximises entropy. The usual way to identify f is to
set up a Lagrangian using the function H and the constraints that characterise
Fxpk1q. (The latter are the subjective moment conditions of Val's preferences.)
For the case where k1  2, the maximum entropy distribution is none other
than the normal distribution with mean and variance satisfying Val's rst two
subjective moments. Thus, when Y is chosen to be a representative sample, the
denition of Wiener measure is such that it is the unique maximiser.
More generally, when f exists, it is the worst case model of Val's information
that the data allow. However, because the uniform density on R does not
correspond to a probability distribution (its integral is innite), there may be
no solution f to the maximum entropy problem. For some interesting examples
and a more complete discussion of this issue see Rockinger and Jondeau [24].
Clearly, a sucient condition is that Fxpk1q is compact, for H is continuous in
f .
Whilst maximising the entropy is one of the most popular approaches to
dealing with complex scenarios involving uncertainty and underidentication, it
is not the only one. At the other extreme, the experimenter may be in a setting
where it is better to give Val the benet of the doubt. If, as in our example
above, the experimenter knows the true distribution of each x P X1, then he
may minimise relative to the true density f 1. That is via the same constrained
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minimisation procedure, with Hp; f 1q replacing Hp; 1q, we obtain a density f
that represents the best case for Val's beliefs. f represents the least conservative
model. In contrast with f , f always exists and is equal to f 1. Clearly, if f 1 is
feasible, so that it belongs to Fxpk1q, this means that the rst k1 subjective
moments that Val revealed were correct.
Finally, for any 0      1, the convex combination p1  qf   f is an
intermediate model of Val. This procedure for nding a distribution that rep-
resents Val's beliefs given her subjective moments, extends to the full collection
of maximum and minimum entropy densities f
x
and fx such that x P X1.
4 Discussion
Related axioms in the literature We now describe the relationship be-
tween condition S and the corresponding condition of Karni and Safra [18],
Karni [17], and Grant et al. [11]. These papers take X to be of the form AL
for a compact set A and a mixture set L. (In Grant et al. [11], A is also a
mixture set.) The axiom corresponding to S is translates as follows
Suppose that ;  P  and p0q  p0q. Then p1q À p1q if and
only if pq À pq for every  P p0; 1s.
The fact that this axiom implies S follows immediately if we take   1{2.
(Consider the fact that  is a subset of À and use the \only if" part of the
statement.) Step 3 of the proof of lemma 4 shows that, together with O and C,
S is sucient for this axiom.
The translation of axiom E2 of Fishburn [8, p.88] to the present notation is
a slightly weaker version of the above: if ;  P , p0q  p0q and p1q   p1q,
then pq   pq for every 0      1. If either of these \independence" axioms
is assumed in the place of S, then theorem 1 holds when the following continuity
axiom is assumed in the place of C
If xy P , z P X and x   z   y, then there are 0   ;    1 such
that xypq   z   xypq.
Finally, A and M do not appear to have featured as axioms in the literature.
The Archimedean axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler [10, 9] is clearly similar to
A even if the structure of preferences is quite dierent. Karni [17] contains a
background assumption which is closely related and indeed sucient for A and
M combined. Karni views this as a property of the set A of acts and refers to
this property as \linked". Similarly an appeal to a condition involving a nite
sequence of overlapping mixture sets is made in proposition 6 of Grant et al.
[11].
To our knowledge, nowhere is it shown that these are part of a necessary
and sucient group of axioms for a cardinal and linear utility representation.
Moreover, as the initial discussion HM highlights, our set up allows for an in-
nite dimensional partial mixture set, where the linear operator that preferences
dene is unbounded and hence discontinuous. (See Fishburn [7], Inoue [15],
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and Monteiro [20] for examples and further discussions of this point.) Only the
multilinear utility model of Fishburn [8] is comparable in this latter sense.
4.1 Related experiments in literature
Experiments that have conducted related exercises include Stecher, Shields, and
Dickhaut [27]. There, agents are shown realisations of processes that do not
have bounded moments. Eectively they consider processes that lie beyond the
method we propose. There is an active debate in the nance literature as to
whether actual stock prices have moments of high order, but there seems to be
little doubt about the lower order moments. In particular rst two moments
: the expected return and volatility of return (see Barndor-Nielsen and Shep-
hard [3] for a detailed discussion and further references to the literature). In
econometric models, even conservative models require the rst four moments
(see for instance Hong, Linton, and Zhang [14]).
In any case, it seems plausible that an agent would trade any random variable
that an experimenter might oer for a nite amount of money. The fact that
we consider random bridges between deterministic points makes this case even
more convincing. Finally, whilst our example is nancial, the main motivation
remains the same in other settings where the dimension of the state space is
large and events are dicult to describe in an intuitive way. In such settings, we
suggest that moments oer a plausible, alternative approach to eliciting beliefs.
A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1 (from page 5). It suces to show that for every
x1; y1 P pIq the path x1y1 belongs to . For every such x1 and y1, there exists
;  P I such that xypq  x1 and xypq  y1. By P3, xx1 ; xy1 P  and
xx1pq  xypq and xy1pq  xypq for every  P I. W.l.o.g., suppose
that  ¤ .
If   , then x1  y1. Moreover, by P2, x1xpq  xx1p1  q and by P1,
x1  x1xp0q. Then one further application of P3 yields x1y1pq  x1xp0q  x1
for every  P I. In this case, clearly, (1) holds with    for every  P I.
If    , then, for some 1   1,   1. Then xy1p1q  x1 and since
y1xp1 1q  xy1p1q, we see that x1  y1xp1 1q. A nal application of P3
yields y1x1pq  y1xpp1  1qq for each  P I. Next note that 1  {, so
that a substitution for 1 and straightforward simplication yields y1x1pq 
y1xpp  q{q for each  P I. Similarly, we have
y1xpp  q{q  xy1p1 p  q{q by P2
 xyp  p  qq by P3:
Let  ÞÑ   1. Substituting for  we have y1x1p1q  xyp pqq.
One nal application of P2 to the left-hand-side of the latter equality yields
both x1y1 and (1)
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Proof of proposition 2 (from page 7). By assumption, X  R3 is pa-
rameterised by equations for a standard sphere. That is x1  r  cosp2q 
sinpq, x2  r  sinp2q  sinpq and x3  r  cospq, where r is the radius of
the sphere, ;  P I,   3:14 : : : , and  denotes standard scalar multiplication.
This parametrisation centers the sphere at the origin p0; 0; 0q.
For every x; y P X, Let xy be the geodesic (the shortest path from x to y
on X). Conditions P1 and P2 of the denition of a mixture set are immediately
satised. We now show that condition P3 holds for any path xy that belongs
to a typical \great circle" on X. Such circles are parametrised by an injective
function f : r0; 1q Ñ X. As a canonical example, let   1{2, so that x3  0.
Then the set of points px1; x2q  fpq : r  pcosp2q; sinp2qq such that
 P r0; 1q, dene a standard circle in R2 as well as a \great circle" on the earth's
surface.
Let x  y on this great circle. Then for some x; y P r0; 1q, x  fpxq
and y  fpyq. Without loss of generality let x   y. Note that xypq 
f pp1 qx   yq for each  P I. That is, f provides a parametrisation of
xy. Suppose that xypq  z for some  P I. Then fpzq  z where z 
p1 qx   y. Recall that for condition P3 of mixture sets, we need to show
xzpq  xypq. This follows by substituting for z in f pp1 qx   zq
and exploiting the convexity of r0; 1q.
Proof of lemma 1 (from page 9). Consider the the set L  t : xypq À
zu. By condition C, L is a closed subset of I. It is nonempty since xyp0q 
x   z. Similarly, the set U  t : z À xypqu is closed and nonempty since
z   xyp1q  y. By O, I is the union of L and U . If L X U  H, then I is
the union of two disjoint, nonempty and closed subsets. Since this would imply
that I is disconnected, this intersection is necessarily nonempty. That is, there
exists  P I such that xypq  z. We have already seen that   0; 1.
Proof of lemma 2 (from page 10). Suppose that x   z   y for some
z P X. Then by lemma 1, there exists at least one  satisfying the required
condition. Suppose that there exists 1    such that xyp1q  z. Then by O,
we have xyp1q  xypq. But since proposition 1 ensures xypIq is a mixture
set and x   y, theorem 4 of HM implies that xyp1q   xypq if and only if
1   . Note that the latter theorem only applies because I now holds.
Now suppose that z À x   y and z  xypq for some unique 0      1.
Let z1  xypq. Then P3 ensures that xz1pq  xypq for every  P I.
Indeed, proposition 1 ensures that z1ypq  xypp1  q   1q. O implies
z1 À x   y and the rst part of this proof ensures that z1ypq  x for some
unique 0 ¤    1. Let x1  z1ypq. Then x1  z1ypq  xypp1  q   q.
Let   p1  q   . Then xypq  x for both   0 and   . Clearly
0    implies 0   : another contradiction of theorem 4 of HM.
Proof of proposition 4. Let x  x1 and y  y1. Since X is a mixture set,
the paths between pairs of elements are dened. I implies both xyp1{2q 
xy1p1{2q and y1xp1{2q  y1x1p1{2q. Since   1   1{2, property P2 mixture
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sets implies both xy1p1{2q  y1xp1{2q and x1y1p1{2q  y1x1p1{2q. Finally, O (in
particular transitivity) ensures that xyp1{2q  x1y1p1{2q.
Proof of lemma 3 (from page 12). Let   xy. Lemma 2 guarantees the
existence of a candidate 0      1 such that pq  z. Take  to be any other
path in  satisfying p0q  x and p1q  y. S ensures that p1{2q  p1{2q.
Condition P3 then ensures the existence of a subpath 0 12 from x to p1{2q
such that 0 12 pq  p{2q for every  P I. A similar path 0 12 exists from x1
to p1{2q. An application of S yields 0 12 p1{2q  0 12 p1{2q. This implies that
p1{4q  p1{4q. An application of condition P2 of partial mixture sets and a
similar argument applied to the paths  1
2 1
and  1
2 1
yields p3{4q  p3{4q. (Using
proposition 1 to translate indierences on subpaths to indierences between 
and .) In this way, the above argument yields pq  pq for every dyadic
rational  P I. Then, since the dyadic rationals are dense in I, there exists a
sequence limn n  , where recall  is our candidate for the proof. W.l.o.g.,
we may take the sequence to be increasing. Then by the proof of lemma 2,
pnq À pq for each n. C then ensures that  belongs to t1 : p1q À pqu.
Repeating the argument with the roles of  and  reversed yields the reverse
weak preference, so that pq  pq, as required.
Proof of lemma 4 (from page 13). If x  y, then the fact that  generates
a concatenation from x to y ensures that p0q  x for some  P . Proposi-
tion 1 ensures that x1x1 P  for some x1 such that x1  x  y. Then by the
discussion immediately following I, x1x1pq  x for every  P I. Thus, x1x1 is
a synchronising concatenation from x to y.
The remainder of the proof accounts for the case x   y. To this end, let
   t : p0q   p1qu.
Step 1 (There exists a minimal, strictly increasing concatenation f from x to
y). Recall from proposition 1 that every  P  has the property that its image
pIq is a mixture set. Then theorem 4 and 5 of HM ensure that every  P 
is of one of the following three types: (i) pq  p1q for every ; 1 P I; (ii)
pq   p1q if and only if    1; or (iii) p1q   pq if and only if    1.
Note that in the presence of the axioms assumed,  is a type (ii) path if and
only if  P  .
By assumption, there is a concatenation f 1 from x to y. Let f 1 be a concate-
nation of m1 paths. Since the nonnegative integers are well-ordered there exists
a concatenation f from x to y of the smallest possible number m ¤ m1 of paths
in . Clearly f is concatenatation only of paths in  , for otherwise, we could
exclude a path and obtain a suitable concatenation with even fewer paths. This
completes the proof of step 1.
Let 1; : : : ; m P   and 0  0        m 1  1 be the sequences that
characterise f .
Step 2 (f is synchronised with 1; : : : m). Take any n  0; : : : ;m. Recall the
transformation T that was introduced in the derivation of 3. Since n   n 1,
the inverse T1pq  p  nq{pn 1  nq is dened for each  P rn; n 1q.
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Then, for each    1, T pq  pn 1  nq   n so that npq  pf  T qpq as
required. Finally, for   1, npq  n 1p0q  fpn 1q.
Step 3 (n is synchronised with  P   if inf n À inf  and sup À supn).
If p0q  fpnq and p1q  fpn 1q, then the fact that  is synchronised
with n follows directly by lemma 3. Now suppose that fpnq À p0q and
p1q À fpn 1q, with at least one relation holding strictly. Lemma 2 implies
npq  p0q and p1q  np1q some unique ; 1 P I such that either 0   
or 1   1.
Since  P  ,    1 follows by theorem 4 of HM and the fact that n P  .
Write n as a concatenation of (at most) three subpaths 
1; 2; 3 P   such
that in particular npq  2pp  q{p1  qq for each  ¤  ¤ 1. (If   0
or 1  1, there are just two paths.) Then 2pq  npp1q 1q for every
 P I. Then 2p0q  p0q and 2p1q  p1q, and lemma 3 ensures 2pq  pq
for every  P I. In turn, we see that  is synchronised with n.
Step 4 (f is synchronised with  of step 3). Recall that npq  fpp1qn 
n 1q for every  P I. For each  P I, let   p1  q  1, where  and 1
were dened in step 3. Then a substitution and straightforward rearrangement
yields pq  fpp1  q   q where   p1  qn   n 1 and  
p1  1qn   1n 1. Since n   n 1 and    1, it is clear that     as
required for f to be synchronising.
Step 5 (f is synchronised with  if p0q   fpnq   p1q for some n). By
step 1, m is minimal and this ensures that fpn1q À p0q and p1q À fpn 1q
(with at least one relation holding strictly). The diculty here is that the n
may be incorrectly specied, so that f travels at a dierent rate on distinct
intervals rn1; nq and rn; n 1q. Example 5 (from page 15) demonstrates
the degree of freedom we have in choosing n. We now show that we can always
respecify the n and obtain a new concatenation that is synchronised with .
Since the resulting concatenation g is composed of the same paths as f , it passes
step 2 and step 3 of this proof.
Let 1 ¤ n ¤ m be the smallest number such that p0q   fpnq   p1q for
some . By lemma 2, there is a unique 0   n   1 such that pnq  fpnq 
n 1p0q. Let fn denote the subconcatenation of f such that fnpq  fpnq
for each    1 and fnp1q  np1q. That is, fn is a concatenation of 0; : : : ; n.
Then lemma 2 ensures that fnpq  p0q and npq  p1q for some unique
0 ¤    1 and 0    ¤ 1. (Note that   0 if and only if p0q  x and
  1 if and only if p1q  fpn 1q and, since m is minimal, both do not hold
simultaneously.)
For every  P rn 1; 1s, take g to satisfy gpq  fpq. On the interval
r0; n 1q, g will be the concatenation of fn, n 1, but unless f is synchronised
with  to begin with, g  f .
Recall that pnq  fpnq. We seek g such that gpnq  pnq where
n  p1 nq   n (6)
for some unique     such that gpq  p0q and gpq  p1q. Since g is to
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be concatenation of fn on r0; nq, we also require fnpq  gpnq for every    1.
The latter equality together with the indierences gpq  p0q  fnpq yields
the equation   n. Similarly, from the concatenation relation between f
and n 1 we obtain the equation   p1  qn   n 1. Substituting for
 and  in (6) and solving for n we nd
n  n
n 1
p1 nqp1 q   n :
Now since    1, 0   n   1 and 0   ; n 1, a suitable n exists and
uniquely so. By construction, g is synchronised with .
Step 6 (g is synchronised with every remaining  P ). By the preceding
steps in this proof, g is synchronised with every 1 such that gp0q À 1p0q and
1p1q À gpn 1q. Note that the denition of g is such that its rate is, in general,
dierent from f on the entire interval r0; n 1q. In particular, for each n1 ¤ n,
n1p0q  gpn1q, where n1  pn{nq  n1 .
A similar argument applies to n 1 if 1p0q   gpn 1q   1p1q for some
1. Since m is nite, we exhaust the set of n such that 1 ¤ n ¤ m in a
nite number of such steps. For n  0 and n  m   1, where n equals 0 and
1 respectively, a very similar argument can also be implemented to ensure the
resulting concatenation is synchronised with every  P   such that x   pq  
y for some 0      1. Let g denote this latter concatenation.
For every other  P  , p1q À x or y À p0q. We adopt the convention
that g is trivially synchronised with  P   if there is at most one indierence
set that is common to them both.
If p0q  p1q, then, since pIq is a mixture set, theorem 5 of HM ensures
that  is of type (i). Then   1 and the proof of this case is immediate.
Finally, condition P2 accounts for every  such that p1q   p0q, so that  is of
type (iii). Since these three cases exhaust , our proof is complete.
Proof of proposition 5 (from page 14) continued. Let Z  tx0; x1; : : : u
be any innite subset of U  such that x0  0 w 0 for some w P W and
xn   xn 1 for each n in Z . Suppose that, for some w PW , xn 1 P Lw, then,
since xn   xn 1, there exists x1n P Lw such that x1n  xn, so that the path n
from x1n to xn 1 belongs to  . Then by lemma 4, there exists a synchronising
concatenation satisfying fpq  nppnq{pn 1nqq for each n. Note that
f is a concatenation, but not a path since f : r0; 1q Ñ X whenever Z is innite.
The properties of I and fact that n   n 1 for each n implies that such a
concatenation is only possible when Z is countable. Let Z denote the collec-
tion of all such countable and increasing sequences in U  and let fZ denote the
synchronising concatenation corresponding to each Z P Z.
The proof of ?? shows that U  is order isomorphic to the long line. As such,
every countable set has an upper bound in U  (see for instance Munkres [21,
Theorem 10.3]). Thus for each Z P Z, there exists x P X such that z À x
for every z P Z. W.l.o.g., suppose that x P Lw. Then, since Lw is a linear
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continuum and the image of fZ is a nonempty subset, sup fZ is a well-dened
element of Lw. For any pair Z;Z
1 P Z, suppose sup fZ À sup fZ1 . The fact
that the concatenations are synchronising ensures that, for every xn P Z, there
exists ; 1 P I such that npq  fZ1pp1  q   1q for every  P I. When
this holds, we say that the set Z2  Z Y Z 1 is reducible to Z 1.
For any subcollection Z1  Z, we say that Z1 is reducible Z 1 P Z if and only
if every Z P Z1 is reducible to Z 1. Let V be a well ordering of the elements of Z.
We proceed by induction. Since each pair Zv and Zv 1 is reducible to the set
with the greatest supremum, the initial step and the inductive step for successor
ordinals is complete. If v is a limit ordinal, then the induction hypothesis ensures
that, for each v1   v, the subcollection Zv1  tZv2 : v2 ¤ v1u is reducible to
one of its component sets, say Zu. Clearly Zu Y Zv is reducible to Zu or Zv
depending on which has the greatest supremum. This shows that Z is reducible
to some countable set Z. That is for every  P , there exists ; 1 P I such
that pq  fZpp1 q  1q for every  P I.
Since Z is countable, supZ P U  and this ensures the existence of w P W 
and y P Lw such that sup fZ   y. But then there is no path xy P  such that
x  0w 0, for otherwise fZpq  y for some  P I. This implies a contradiction
of O or the fact that Lw is a mixture set.
Proof of lemma 5. Fix x   y.
Case 1 (the implication of A holds with indierence). By lemma 2, either
inf 0  0p0q of sup0  0p0q. If it is the latter, appeal to condition P2 to
obtain 10 such that 10p0q  x. If it is the former, simply relabel 0 as 10 and
proceed to 1. Similarly, if sup0  0p0q, then once again appeal to condition
P2 to obtain 
1
1 such that 
1
1p0q  inf 11. Since m is nite, we exhaust the
sequence by this recursive procedure.
Let f be a concatenation of 10; : : : ; 1m. Then lemma 4 ensures the existence
of a synchronising concatenation g from x to y.
Case 2 (not case 1 ). By the argument of case 1, w.l.o.g. suppose that inf n 
np0q for each n. Suppose that 0p0q   x. W.l.o.g., we may assume that m is
the minimal length of a sequence satisfying A. Then x  0pq for some    1,
for otherwise, we can exclude 0 and obtain a shorter sequence. By O and
lemma 2,  is unique. Using the partial mixture set conditions (see discussion
before denition 2), take 10 P  such that 10pq  0pp1  q   q for each
 P I. If 1p0q   1p1q, then, by the same method that was used to obtain
10, we can nd 11 such that 11p0q  10p1q, and 10p1q   11pq if 0   . Once
again, since m is nite, in this way we can dene a suitable sequence 10; : : : ; 1m
such that the conditions for case 1 of the present proof to apply.
Proof of lemma 6 (from page 16). Fix x   z   y. By lemma 5,  gener-
ates a synchronising concatenation from x to y. Let 0; : : : ; m and 0  0  
     m 1  1 be the sequences that dene f . Take g to be any other syn-
chronising concatenation from x to y that is characterised by 0; : : : ; k and
0  0        k 1  1.
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Case 3 (for every 1 ¤ n ¤ m and every 1 ¤ j ¤ k, fpnq  gpjq). Note that
in this case, we do not need to appeal to M: we can use the paths that make
f and g. W.l.o.g., suppose that fp1q   gp1q   fp2q. Then, by lemma 2,
0p1q  1p1q for some unique 0   1. (The fact that 0p1q  1p0q  
0p1q implies that 0   1.) Then, for some 1, fp1q  1p1q and, since f is
synchronising, 0pq  fp1q for every  P I. That is, fp1q  gp1q for every
 P I. If gp1q  y, then 1  1 and, since fpq  y if and only if   1, we have
1  1 as required.
If gp2q   fp2q, then repeat the argument of the last paragraph: using 1
instead of 0 to show that fp2q  gp2q for every  P I and some 0   2 ¤ 1.
If on the other hand, suppose that fp2q   gp2q   fp3q, then the argument of
the previous paragraph applies, with the exception that now we use the fact 1
is synchronised with g. In all cases, the fact that m and k are nite, 0  0  0
and m 1  k 1  1 means that we eventually establish that fpq  gpq for
every  P I as required.
Case 4 (for some 1 ¤ n ¤ m and 1 ¤ j ¤ k, fpnq  gpjq). Suppose that
x   fp1q  gp1q   y. Together, M, lemma 2 and condition P2 ensure the
existence of  such that  p0q   fp1q    p1q and  p1q  fp1q for some
unique 1 P I. W.l.o.g. (by passing to a subpath where necessary) suppose that
x À  p0q and  p1q   gp2q À fp2q.
Since gp2q À fp2q, there exists 2 such that fp2q  gp2q. Let  P 
be the subpath of 1 such that 
pq  fpp1  q1   2q for every  P I.
Then, lemma 3, pq  1pq for every  P I. Similarly, since fp1q  gp1q,
0pq  0pq for every  P I.
Then there exist unique    1 and 0    such that 0pq   p0q and
pq   p1q. Then, by the argument of step 5 in the proof of lemma 4 and
the fact that f is synchronising to begin with,
1  
12
p1 1qp1 q   1 (7)
But, since we also have 0pq   p0q and 1pq   p1q, we may derive a
similar equation to (7), with 1 and 2 substituting for 1 and 
2 respectively.
If 2  1, then, as in case 3, 1  1 and the proof is complete. Otherwise,
we may minor variations of the present argument or that of case 3, to extend
and show that 2 depends in a similar way on 2 and 2 on some 2 such that
gp2q  fp2q. Since m and k are nite, we repeat until we reach m 1 
k 1  1, at which point fpq  gpq for every  P I and the proof is complete.
Proof of theorem 1 (from page 17). If   H, then by O, x  y for every
x; y P X. In this case, every utility representation is both linear and cardinal.
Conversely, both A and M hold vacuously when   H. This ensures that the
axioms are necessary and sucient in this case.
Henceforth, suppose that   H.
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Step 7 (Necessity of the axioms). The proof that O, C and S are necessary
for a cardinal, linear representation is clear and therefore omitted.
We now use counterexamples to prove that A andM are necessary for such
a representation. First note that example 5 is a representative counterexample
for the case where A holds and M does not. For the case where there exists a
linear utility representation and M holds but A does not, see example 7 in the
proof of corollary 1 below. A similar accounts for the case where both M and
A fail to hold.
In each of these cases, any linear utility representation fails to be cardi-
nal. The only remaining case is where A and M both hold. In this case, a
representation of the required form exists by the following argument.
Step 8 ( Suciency of the axioms). Consider the quotient set X{. Each
element of X{ consists of an indierence class generated by preferences on X.
X{ is well-dened because O ensures that the indierence classes partition X.
Let p : X Ñ X{ be the natural projection x ÞÑ ty : y  xu. Let F{ be the set
of paths f 1 in X{ such that f 1  p  f for some synchronising concatenation
f that is generated by  in X. The arguments of the next two paragraphs
demonstrate that pX{; F{q is a mixture set whenever   H. To be clear, all
remaining arguments in this proof (and indeed the paper) proceed in X, not
X{.
If x   y, then lemmas 5 and 6 guarantee the existence and (upto indier-
ence) uniqueness of a synchronising concatenation f from x to y. A repeated
application of condition P2 yields the concatenation g from y back to x exists
and satises gpq  fp1  q for every  P I. For condition P3, suppose that
z  fpq for some z P X and  P I. Since f is generated by , take gpq  fpq
for each  P I. Then gpq  npp  nq{pn 1  nqq for each n such that
n    and each  P I. If  ¡ 0, then simple division of the numerator and
denominator in each n shows that g is a well-dened concatenation. If   0,
then gpq  0p0q for every  P I and by condition P3, there exists  P  such
that g  .
If x  y, then rst suppose x À x1 for every x1 P X. Since   H, there
exists y1 such that x   y1. In this case, lemma 5 ensures the existence of a
synchronising concatenation f from x to y1. Then fpq  x for   0 and
the preceding paragraph completes the proof. The case where x1 À x for every
x1 P X is similar, so we proceed to the case where x1   x   y1 for some x1; y1 P X.
In this case, M and lemma 2 ensure that x  z1  pq for some  P  and
0      1. By proposition 1, pIq is a mixture set and z1z1 P . Finally,
since z1z1pq  x for every  P I, z1z1 is synchronising concatenation from x
to y. Finally, since condition P1 holds in every case, we have shown that, upto
indierence, X a mixture set.
For the axioms, recall from our discussion following denition 2, that, by
virtue of C, concatenations inherit continuity from the continuity of members
of . Moreover, lemma 6 is clearly sucient for the property fp1{2q  gp1{2q for
any pair of synchronising concatenations such that fp0q  gp0q   fp1q  gp1q.
That is to say, synchronising concatenations satisfy an independence axiom akin
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to S. We may therefore apply the main theorem of HM to obtain a cardinal and
linear utility representation of preferences. In summary, we have completed the
proof that the axioms are sucient for the required utility representation.
Proof of corollary 1 (from page 17). The fact that the axioms are suf-
cient for cardinality when preferences have a linear representation follows from
theorem 1: O, C and S hold whenever preferences have a linear representation.
For the necessity of the axioms, note that, since example 4 fails to give rise to
a utility representation, it is of no use for the present proof. Example 5 accounts
for the case where A holds, M does not. The following example accounts for
the case where M holds, but A does not.
Example 7. Let X be the disjoint union of tnpIq; npIq P   : n P Z u. Sup-
pose that for every n P Z : np0q  n 1p0q and np1q   n 1p1q. Thus every
n has the same inmum and the supremum is strictly increasing in n. More-
over, suppose that, for every m;n P Z , mp1q   np0q, so that any element of
any npIq is strictly better than any element of any mpIq. Finally, in contrast,
let every n have the same supremum and let the inmum be decreasing in n.
That is, np1q  n 1p1q and np0q   n 1p0q for every n P Z .
In this case, the fact that Z  is unbounded ensures that M holds. Take
any x P mpIq and y P npIq. If z P m 1pIq, then m 2 is a path such that
m 2p0q   z   m 2p1q. However, this example clearly violates A, for  does
not generate a concatenation from x to y.
Suppose preference have a linear representation U . We now show that U
is not cardinal. Let rr; sq and pt; us be the respective image sets of tU  mu
and tU  nu. Since U is a utility function, s ¤ t. Dene V : X Ñ R such
that V pzq  Upzq for every z P m mpIq. For every z P n npIq, let V pzq 
   Upzq, where  ¡ 1 and    t  t. Such a choice is always possible since
t t   0 and we have complete freedom choose    0.
It is straightforward to conrm that V is a linear utility representation. But
since it not a positive ane transformation of U , the latter is not cardinal.
This accounts for all but the case where both A and M fail to hold. The
latter is accounted for by a simplication of example 7 to the case where X is
the union of just two paths  and . Since pq   pq for every ;  P I, A
fails to hold, just as in example 7. The fact that M fails to hold follows by
considering that p0q   p1q   p1q: there is no path in  that satises M for
the point p1q.
Since the linear representations in all these examples fails to be cardinal, we
have the implication: not [A and M] implies not cardinal as required.
Proof of proposition 6 (from page 19). Let   p1 q  . We only
prove the case for   xy P Y . The dierence between this and the more
general case is only a matter of notation. Moreover, since p1q ra  pb aqs 
 rpa  pb aqs is equal to a   pb  aq, which is convex combination, the
remainder of the argument shows that the nonconvexity arises from the product
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of p1 tq and the integral term in (4). Since 1   p1 qp1 q   p1 q,
we have
p1 qp1 q
» 
0
1
1 r dWr   p1 q
» 
0
1
1 r dWr
 p1 q
» 
0
1
1 r dWr   error;
where
error  p1 qp1 q
» 

1
1 r dWr   p1 q
» 

1
1 r dWr:
The fact that the latter two integrals are dened on nondegenerate and nonover-
lapping intervals ensures that the two stochastic integrals are independent ran-
dom variables that are nonzero with probability one. With the same probability,
the error is therefore nonzero and  is nonconvex.
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